Why
Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government emissaries
talking peace.
In early November, negotiators from
the Burmese government traveled to the northern town of Myitkyina to confer
with representatives from a conglomeration of ethnic rebel groups. It was the
first time in decades of warfare that government officials sat down with the
combined leadership of Burma's rebel movements, inspiring praise from the United
Nations.
But the optimistic news coverage neglected
to question the presence of another interest group at the meeting:
the Chinese. With billions of dollars invested in energy, mining, and logging
projects in Kachin state, China has a lot at stake in the outcome of this
conflict, which has threatened its access to the area's abundant resources. Its
involvement served as a palpable reminder (as if anyone needed it) that peace
talks between the government and ethnic rebels aren't just about political
differences. They're also very much about business.
That's a hard truth that's all too
often neglected in coverage of the continuing efforts to find a practical
agenda for peace. China is but one of many players in the scramble to
capitalize on the fantastically abundant natural resources in Burma's border regions,
which run the gamut from teak to minerals to hydropower, not to mention
Kachin state's $8 billion jade industry. The Burmese government used past
ceasefires as an opportunity to plunder areas inhabited by local ethnic groups,
prompting additional armed conflict while complicating efforts to resolve it.
Indeed, the government's recent reform push may be attempting to do the same
thing. All signs suggest that the government is hoping to exploit the bounty of
Burma's periphery as it opens to foreign investment.
This issue is one of the primary
irritants underlying the government's fight with the rebels in Kachin state.
Among Burma's many ethnic groups, the Kachin have particular experience with
the Burmese government's malformed "peace." In 1994, the government
managed to broker a peace agreement that ended decades of civil war. But the
ceasefire did not mean that the regime began to take the Kachin's interests
into consideration. During the 17-year ceasefire period, the Kachin watched as
their state was carved up and sold to regime-aligned corporations -- usually
with little benefit to the people who lived there.
Following the 1994 deal, Burmese and
Chinese firms moved in to control the local economy, whittling small businesses
down to nothing, and bringing in thousands of migrant workers who forced the
Kachin out of jobs. The influx of migrant workers and rising poverty rates had
a corrosive effect on Kachin society. At the
same time, the Kachin's land was cordoned off for corporate exploitation.
Nearly 20 percent of the state's land was allocated for mining, while nearly
200,000 acres of land in the Hukawng Valley Tiger Reserve were
set aside for biofuel crops. Shortly after the 1994 agreement, the government
rolled out plans to build seven dams along the N'Mai and Mali Rivers to be
financed by China. When they are completed, most of the output will go to
China, ignoring local energy needs. This will only ramp up anti-business
feelings among the Kachin.
And in 1994, the exploitation of the
ceasefire didn't stop at business. The Burmese army used the ceasefire period
to bolster its presence in Kachin state. This meant that when the Burmese
troops launched an assault on Kachin rebels in June 2011 -- intentionally
rekindling the war -- they had a strategic advantage. Battalions were already
stationed en masse across the state, ready to widen the conflict. Moreover,
because the ceasefire had blurred territorial boundaries, government troops
were able to block fleeing civilians reentering rebel-controlled areas. In the
face of violent conflict, these civilians could not get home. This nightmare
scenario continues today, as evidenced by the thousands of civilians who fled
after fresh clashes broke out less than a
fortnight ago. Conversely then, the ceasefire period allowed greater
militarization of the region, and eroded the security of its people.
It's no coincidence then that the
Kachin faction is reluctant to sign a deal before knowing what the Burmese
government plans for the state's resources. Doing so may presage a repeat of
the destructive business practices that have steadily eaten away at the state.
The Kachin have noted the eerie parallels between this round of talks and those
in 1994. The presence of Chinese observers at this week's ceasefire talks
suggests that Beijing's interests in the outcome of the conflict are as
pressing as they were 20 years ago. Despite various rounds of talks this year
where the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) pressed the government to
come clean on its plans for the state after the proposed ceasefire, the two
sides have continually failed to cement a political deal that would demarcate
territory and delegate rights to resources.
For an ethnic group that has long
called for autonomy, the prospect of another ceasefire without a political
resolution to these chronic problems is unthinkable. In that respect, foreign
governments who used the Myanmar Peace Center -- widely considered a mascot for
the government's reformist agenda -- to hurry ethnic armies into laying down
their arms either do not understand the source of the Kachin's reluctance, or
are practicing willful, perhaps even strategic, denial. Burma's border regions
have a reputation as a final untapped energy market, and that is a tough
incentive to ignore.
If the Kachin had any doubts that
the government is prioritizing business, last year's talks in Karen state would
dispel them. In early 2012, the government was able to hammer out a ceasefire
agreement with the Karen National Union (KNU) following decades of conflict --
but only by encouraging pro-business Karen officials to deviate from the more
hard-line faction. These pro-business officials agreed to open a liaison office
in exchange for development assistance that would open the door to large-scale investment
in the region, which is rich in gold, hydropower, and possibly
even shale gas.
This same pro-business group
participated in ceasefire talks with the government in 2011 that included
delegates from Dawei Princess, a local partner in a massive deep-sea port
project under construction close to the Karen's territory. The delegates were
invited despite resistance from the
KNU. The make-up of these early meetings offered an early indication of the
business dimension to the ceasefire talks.
Opening the doors for foreign
development has had serious consequences for the people of Karen state. A 2012 report by
Physicians for Human Rights spotlighted the link between extractive projects
and rights abuses in the region. It warned that people who lived near a dam,
pipeline, or mine were "almost eight times more likely to have been forced
to work for the army and over six times more likely to have been uprooted or
had restrictions placed on their travel." (A useful National Geographic
map offers visual evidence
for this.) The half a million people displaced by war in eastern Burma hope to
return to their land soon, but as the Kachin who returned after the 1994
ceasefire found, this land may now belong to someone else.
Rather than working to compromise
with the KNU, the government decided to open a fissure in the one entity that
commands respect across Karen society. The Burmese government may have won a
flimsy ceasefire, but the prospects for lasting peace in a region familiar with
the duplicity and abusive tactics of the Burmese army are slim.
On top of all this, the parliament
passed a new foreign investment law earlier this year that offers attractive
incentives for business in Burma. It also conveniently places the regulation of
harmful practices in the hands of the Burmese government, which has historically shown no
inclination toward responsible investment. It is likely that companies will be
free to operate in the same way they have for years, and with the same
consequences.
Everyone from corporate clients,
to foreign governments,
to the Burmese military seems to be entering the fray to advocate for what
Kevin Woods calls "ceasefire capitalism"
-- that familiar shadowy nexus of military, political, and business elites that
has dominated Burma's economy for 50 years, exploiting periods of calm to
assert control over land. Everyone, that is, except for the ethnic groups at
the center of these talks. It certainly seems that Burma is in danger of
repeating history by tainting its peace negotiations with the interests of
those who do not prioritize peace. Away from the optimistic talk greeting
the ceasefire negotiations lies the ugly side of the reform process.
All told, civilians face many of the same dangers they did during wartime.
BY: Francis
Wade, 5 December 2013.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/afghanistan_karzai_bilateral_security
Why
Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government
emissaries talking peace - See more at:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/ceasefire_capitalism#sthash.rFzmtQJS.dpuf
Why
Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government
emissaries talking peace - See more at:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/ceasefire_capitalism#sthash.rFzmtQJS.dpuf
Why
Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government
emissaries talking peace - See more at:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/ceasefire_capitalism#sthash.rFzmtQJS.dpuf
Ceasefire Capitalism
Ceasefire Capitalism
Why Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government emissaries talking peace.
- See more at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/ceasefire_capitalism#sthash.rFzmtQJS.dpuf
Why Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government emissaries talking peace.
- See more at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/ceasefire_capitalism#sthash.rFzmtQJS.dpuf
Ceasefire Capitalism
Why Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government emissaries talking peace.
- See more at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/ceasefire_capitalism#sthash.rFzmtQJS.dpuf
Ceasefire Capitalism
Why Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government emissaries talking peace.
- See more at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/ceasefire_capitalism#sthash.rFzmtQJS.dpuf
Ceasefire Capitalism
Why Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government emissaries talking peace.
- See more at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/ceasefire_capitalism#sthash.rFzmtQJS.dpuf
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