Showing posts with label Commentary. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Commentary. Show all posts

Ja Lungseng hte Wunpawng Myu Sha ni a Rawt Malan Hkrun Lam

0 comments Wednesday, March 12, 2014
By: Zung Ring (7 January 2014)

Rawt malan masing masa awng dang na matu gaw, zai ladat grai jaw ra ai. Zai ladat gaw, seng ang ai rawt malan hpung a ginra masa hta hkan nna shai chye nga ai. Jaw ai zai ladat hpe shaw lang lu na matu, tinang rawt malan wuhpung a n'gun (strength) hte gawng hkya lam (weakness) ni hpe atsawm sha chye na ra nga ai. 
Ndai laika kaw e, rawt malan hpung a 'n-gun' (strength) hta hkan nna jai lang chye ai zai ladat hpe bawng ban na re. Ga shadawn hku nna, Wunpawng Mungdan Shang Lawt Hpyen Dap (KIA) a n'gun gaw, mungkan hta grai manu dan ai ja lungseng ni hte hpring tsup ai Wunpawng Mungdan lamu ga rai nga ai. 
Tinang KIO/ KIA hpe mungkan kaw na garum wa hkra, KIO a mung masa hpe mungkan masha ni myit lawm wa hkra, maigan mungdan na hpaga la/num (company) ni tinang KIO hte bungli galaw mayu wa hkra, galaw lu na matu gaw, Hpakant ginra hpe tsepkawp lu madu da ra ai. 
Hpakant ginra hpe tsepkawp lu uphkang sai nga yang gaw; 
(1) mungkan a ja lungseng hpaga hpe tsepkawp madu (monopoly) lu ai hte bung sai. Dai hta n'ga, mungkan kaw lungseng manu hpe mai jum tek sai. Ga shadawn, Ja lungseng htu shaw ai lam ding yang byin/nbyin (stable) nchye ai majaw Hong Kong kaw lung seng manu grai rawt sai lam hpe 7 January 2014 ya shani SAW YAN NAING & ECHO HUI yan Irrawaddy kaw ka da ai. 
Mungkan kaw lungseng manu hpe tek jum lu ai sha n'ga, lungseng hpaga galaw mayu ai masha yawng gaw KIO hpe ahkang hpyi la ra sai. Dai majaaw, KIO gaw Wunpawng myu sha ni a tara shang asuya re lam (political legitimacy) hpe grau nna dan dawng wa na hta n'ga, hkap la wa na re. 
(2) Hpakant ginra hpe lu madu yang, ja gumhpraw law law shang na re. Wunpawng Mungdan a lungseng hpaga gaw, laning mi hta "US$ 8 billion" nga ai nga nna (Andrew R.C. Marshall & Min Zayar Oo) gaw 29 September 2013 hta Reuters shiga kaw ka da ai. Ndai gaw, lungseng hte seng ai gumhpraw sha naw re. Ndai ram manu dan ai lungseng gatlawk (jade market) hpe madu lu sai nga yang, Wunpawng myu sha ni a mung masa pandung gaw ani sha rai sai.
(3) Ja gumhpraw arang lu sai nga yang, tinang KIA hpyen dap hpe prat dep ai hpyen dap langai shatai lu na hta n'ga, myu sha ni a nga mu nga mai lam, hpaji lam, hkam ja lam, sut masa lam ma hkra hpe mung galaw lu sai. 
(4) Tinang a mungdaw hpe tsep kawp uphkang lu sai nga yang, anhte myu sha ni myit mada ai mung masa pandung de du na matu loi sai. Ga shadawn, Iraq mungdan kaw na Kurdistan mungdaw hpe yu ga. Ndai Kurdistan mung daw gaw, Iraq mungdan kaw sha raitim, tinang mungdaw a laksan makawp maga hpyen dap, balik dap, nbung li dap ni nga ai. International airport nga ai. Maigan na company law law mung Kurdish asuya hte ta gindun nna hpaga ga nga masai. Kade nna yang, laksan mungdan tai na sai nga nna masha law law yu maram taw nga masai. 
Gin chyum hku nna, Hpankant ginra hpe tsep kawp madu lu yang gaw, Wunpawng myu sha ni a mung masa pandung de grau lawan du shangun na zai ladat langai rai na re.
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Confiscation and Compensation in Kachin State: What can powerless farmer do?

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By: Mangshang (9th August 2009), Kachin State, Myanmar.


A lion tirelessly chases and catches a prey. But before it can taste the fruits of its arduous labor, a flock of hyenas robs it and all it can do is helplessly look at the perpetrators. Such is a common example we often see on television programs aired on Animal Planet.

Just like the poor lion, Mr. Lahpai Gam (a pseudonym) has had to abandon his well-tended farm after the National Defense Army-Kachin (NDAK) confiscated his land. 

On his nearly five acre farm, Mr. Lahpai Gam has already grown numerous crops such as rubber plants, walnut trees, hardwood trees bearing a pungent smelling edible fruits (locally known as Tanyin Tee) and pineapples. He has already invested a lot of money, four years of time, passion and effort in the farm. 

Since 2004, farmers have engaged in slash-and-burn cultivation to sustain long-term gardening in the area. They knew that the new road which is part of the Ledo Road (also known as General Stilwell Road which was used during WWII) will pass along the Sadung river. This gave them incentive as they dreamed of easy transportation. The road will be a major commercial route connecting India and China in the future. It was already completed in 2007. 

As usual, farmers do not have land ownership permits (Land Grant) because they do not know whether it is wise to apply for land owner permits from the government. In fact, no one applies for land ownership permits in Sadung Township areas. Since they did not apply for land ownership permit, the areas are essentially free land before the government. 

NDAK later also came to start large scale farming covering hundreds of acres in the areas. They applied for land ownership permits from the government and as a result local farmers’ lands have now fallen under the control of the NDAK and their newly acquired land permits.
NDAK then confiscated land from local farmers and gave them a measly 50,000 Kyat each (approximately US$50) as compensation. There are about fourteen farmers so far whose land has been confiscated. 

Since losing their land in 2008 to the NDAK, farmers are now opening up new lands for farming nearby. Everyday they can see the plants they cultivated before having their land confiscated and feel deeply saddened for losing them. 

When asked why the farmers were compensated so little, an NDAK official in Sadung Pa town who has knowledge of the story (he asked to remain anonymous) dared not comment on the subject.

The NDAK signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese military government in 1989. It attended the government-orchestrated National Convention which drafted the constitution that was ratified in the 2008 referendum. Recently, under government pressure, the NDAK has also agreed to transform itself into a border security force. 

When asked why he did not complain to the officials, Mr. Lahpai Gam said that he is afraid of being recognized and subsequently targeted. 

Sadung area is under the control of three officials – the military government, NDAK and Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). Sadung area became a new township in 2008.
As a result, there are now more government offices such as immigration, labor department office, telecommunication and fire station, in addition to a police station and military base. According to sources, these offices were built on private land and compensation for confiscated land was far from satisfactory. 

A local resident complained that none of the three authorities are fulfilling the needs of the people who now have to serve three masters.
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Panglong Agreement not forgotten

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By Zung Ring, 5th February 2010.

The spirit of Panglong Agreement is the key message of Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) on its 49th Anniversary today (5th Feb). KIO demands the military government to implement Pang Long Agreement which signed 1947.

In the statement by Lanyaw Zawng Hra, KIO Chairman, “We have to re-live the Panglong Agreement for building the genuine Union of Myanmar.”

The statement states that KIO’s bottom line is to have the right of self-determination within genuine federal union of Myanmar. It adds that if the military government genuinely wants to have national solidarity, the promises made in Panglong Agreement must be honored.

The military government has been forcing all the ceasefire groups to transform into border guard force (BGF) but KIO refuses to accept the proposal. Col. James Lum Dau said (on Thursday) it is a tactic of the government to take silent coup by reducing the number of KIA troops.

KIO has been under huge pressure from the military government to accept the government proposal – BGF. In this year’s Manau festival on 10th January, Kachin State Day, KIO was not allowed to wear uniform.

KIO was founded on February 5, 1961, by three brothers: Zau Seng, Zau Tu and Zau Dan after then U Nu government declared Buddhism as the state religion. Since its establishment, Kachin Independence Army (KIA) the arm wing of KIO has fought effectively against the government forces in Kachin State throughout in 1960s until the present ceasefire was signed in 1994.

The original aim of fighting for complete independence was changed in 1976 to remain in genuine federal union of Myanmar.

Since its establishment, leaderships have changed – Lahtaw Zau Seng, Maran Brang Seng, Mali Zup Zau Mai, Lamung Tu Jai, and Lanyaw Zawng Hra. However, it has not achieved much. But Col. James Lum Dau said if KIO did not take arm struggle, the situation of Kachin people would be worse today.

A village elder said, “the Burmese government does not dare to do whatever they wish to Kachin people because of KIA”.

KIO signed ceasefire agreement with the military government on February 24, 1994 to solve the political problems in peaceful means. KIO have had numerous meetings with the military government for political talk but failed to bring any political breakthrough.

The disappointments among Kachin community is widespread because the ceasefire not only failed to bring any desirable political result but lost controls over lands especially lucrative areas such as Phakant (jade is mined), Hu Gawng region (where timber, gold is rich).

Col. James Lum Dau said that some of the benefits of ceasefire are – children have more access to education and scattered family members are reunited.

How long the ceasefire will last?

This answer perhaps mainly depends on what the military government will do next if its BGF proposal to ceasefire groups completely failed.

Among the ceasefire groups such as KIO and UWSA already rejected the BGF proposal. From November 2009, KIA has been giving basic military training to civilians as village defense forces (VDF). According to a KIO official, it is a central policy of KIO to give the training.

According to a civilian who receives such training, the trainees can go back their villages. The training is mostly voluntary basis.
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Affirmative Actions in Dilema

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Summary Outline

This paper is divided into three main parts to address the given question. Part (1) will define Affirmative Action (AA) in historical context so that to enable us understand better why AA becomes necessary in social policies such as education and employment. Part (2) is to attempt presenting some reasons why AA can never be sufficient enough to compensate the loss of the victims of past discrimination and thus, should not be seen as compensation but rather as recognition of the past misconduct. In part (3), it is explained why implementation of AA does not violate the principle of equality. Part (4) provides few examples of AA in practice provides in some countries. Finally, part (5) concludes with a brief summary of the paper.

Part One: Definition of Affirmative Action in Historical Context

In human history, perhaps, there are more dark sides than bright ones as far as racial/gender/sex matter is concerned. For example, white people traded black people as slaves; women were treated as second class citizen, social caste system in India where people from low caste were discriminated for generations. As result, black people were dominated by white people both politically and economically for generations; women were unable to vote and access to higher education; low castes were denied for higher education. These inequalities become the source of political and social tension/conflict.

In realizing the conflicts, a new social policy called Affirmative Action (AA) was introduced in USA in the 1960s. Stanford Encyclopaedia defines ‘AA’ as “positive steps taken to increase the representation of women and minorities in areas of employment, education, and business from which they have been historically excluded. When those steps involve preferential selection - selection on the basis of race, gender, or ethnicity.”

In short, ‘AA’ can perhaps, be viewed as a social policy to offer preferential treatment to the victims of the past discrimination or disadvantaged groups with a hope of enabling them to compete with the mainstream fairly and building more equitable society.

The AA however, has never been free of controversy. Politicians, scholars, social activists have been arguing back and forth about the subject but the debate is far from over. In fact, it seems that debate over AA issue intensifies in recent years. In April 2003, The University of Michigan and The University of California were brought to The US Supreme Court by a few white students accusing the universities of being racially biased when they were rejected for admission. Their case was not only supported by many white republican congressmen but also the president, George W. Bush. However, the court allows the universities to consider racial factor for admission. The officials of the universities said that preferential treatment is the only effective measure to bring multi-ethnic students into the campus.


Part Two: Can Affirmative Action Compensate the Loss of the Victims of the Past Discrimination?


A short answer to this question is ‘No’ because the losses are so great and beyond measure that no AA is significant enough to compensate those losses. If look back history, it will be clearer.

People were sold as slaves, served as slaves for generations without any benefit, died in vain, lost their human dignity, people being treated very badly (attended in segregated school with limited and poor quality resources) and were exploited every possible ways. Women and minorities were treated as second class citizen, their basic human rights were violated and voices were silenced for generations.

For example, South Africa was ruled by minority white people until 1994. Despite they were (still is) being minority, they have total domination in all sectors from education to economy since they were the rulers. White children were able to access to best education of the country from segregated schools (White only schools) and took up all the important professions. On the other hand, black children were prevented from getting quality education and obviously they cannot compete with the whites. Consequently, they were and are still in disadvantaged position due to the past discriminatory policies.

In 2004, I was able to join in a regional conference on human rights in Asia held in Chiangmai, Thailand. I still remember an Indian conference panelist describing a typical story of caste system in Indian society. She said that if you were born to a low caste (also known as untouchable caste) family, it is extremely difficult to access to higher education and find a decent job regardless of your qualification. She added, if you were also happened to be a woman born to such low caste, it is virtually impossible to get education especially with limited resources.

The point is, there is abundance of examples how people were discriminated and exploited. The lists can go on endlessly. The losses are beyond measure. Therefore, it is very inappropriate to look at AA as compensation because no AA can and will ever be sufficient enough to be able to compensate those losses of the victims of past discriminations and ill-treatments.


Part Three: Does ‘AA’ Violate Principle of Equality?


As presented earlier, the issue of ‘AA’ is controversial. It is hard to find an outright answer to argue that ‘AA’ does or does not violate the principle of equality. Critics argue that AA is reversal discriminatory policy and violates the equality principle. On the other hand, supporters of AA argue that principle of equality is not violated in implementing AA and even if there is violation of principle of equality involved, it is fair and good for the whole society for the future. Thus, it would be fair to look at some arguments both for and against the ‘AA’.

Arguments against Affirmative Action

One of the most common arguments against the ‘AA’ is that ‘AA’ creates reverse discrimination against one particular group (e.g., former discriminators or of their new generation). The argument is something like ‘why should I be now punished for the crime I did not commit?’

Jain, Sloane & Horwitz (2003, p-17) also mention a series of some negative impacts of AA (a) it is difficult for civil services to maintain image as impartial and politically neutral because political decisions are constantly made base on ethnic consideration rather objective criteria, (b) AA can perpetuate and even strengthen ethnic division, (c) AA also tends to create conflicts within the preferential groups themselves because only small section of people can benefit from the AA programme, (d) it is argued that once AA is introduced, it becomes permanently rooted in the political system serving the interests of small group.

Dani and Haan (2008, p-233) point out negative impacts of AA – it is inefficient, only “creamy layer” of the few benefit from the AA, largely remain unbenefit. AA also reaffirms the individual identity as deprived or minority (people may suffer labelling effect).

Arguments for Affirmative Action

Supporters argue that it is fair to give preferential treatment to marginalized groups because they have historically been discriminated. For example, white people today in general are better off than black people because they have been historically able to enjoy institutional supports – able to go to best colleges/universities and get high value professions. They continue to be in dominating position. If the two groups are to compete openly, marginalized people will surely be left behind because of the unequal starting point. AA is to make the starting point equal/fair.

Without AA, disadvantaged/marginalized/minority people continue to remain in disadvantaged positions. Social division or class and income gap will be widened which can result social instability. Thus, implementation of AA is the best interest of all members of society.

US President Bill Clinton is among the strong supporters of AA. He asserts that the job of ending discrimination remains unfinished; strongly defends AA. "Mend it, but don't end it," he says.

Dani and Haan (2008, p-233) conclude that the effect and impact of AA is so great – people many people from deprived group accessed to education and find decent job improve their social status and boost self-confidence.

Part Four: Affirmative Actions in Practice

Nowadays, Affirmative Action (AA) is not only used as recognition of the past discriminatory policy but also as to reduce extreme poverty by providing education and employment opportunity as well as to create social harmony in society in order to reflect cultural and social diversity. In another word, it is used to give equal opportunity to formerly marginalized groups in order to enable them compete with the mainstream. Scholars describe this as nation building or state formation policy – intends to include all members of society into the mainstream. AA may be controversial but many governments are adopting it. The followings are some of the real examples.

Northern Ireland: Schapper and Burns (2007, p-369) Northern Ireland was torn apart for decades by the civil war between Protestants and Catholics. British Prime Minister, Tony Blair orchestrated peaceful settlement programme between the two communities. In order to maintain the fragile peace, it is imperative to draw Catholic candidates into the (Protestants dominated) police force and other civil services. It enables Catholics to find jobs much easier.

South Korea: On 30th October 2008, BBC reported that a South Korean law which states that only the visually impaired can be licensed masseurs has been upheld in the country's Constitutional Court. The Court’s reason is that "Massage is in effect the only occupation available for the visually handicapped and there is little alternative to guarantee earnings for those persons." Such kind of state intervention/ preferential treatment should be welcome because it recognizes the needs of visually impaired and gives them a sense of hope and shows that they are still part of the society. In addition, the law gives blind people a chance to make their living, without such law, they would have extremely hard time to find job in other business fields.

India: Indian constitution guaranteed equal opportunity. Dani and Haan (2008, p-230) “The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation” (Directive Principle of State Policy, article 46).

However, people from untouchable class (low caste) were left behind for generations. In 1990, the government launched ambitious reform – preserving and reserving places in government jobs and state fund colleges and universities.

Currently, 22.5% of the seats in state-funded educational institutions are reserved. With an additional 27% of seats set aside, the total caste-based educational quota will be raised to 49.5%.

Currently, 27% of government jobs are reserved. Prime Minster Manmohan Singh has now suggested that companies too should take up this action plan and extend the percentage .

Nethralpal Singh, 29, is one of the millions who has benefited from the reform. He is from low caste group and has accessed to higher education through AA, and is now a lecturer in Dheli University (one of the top universities in the country). He says “people from socially disadvantaged sections are very often also financially disadvantaged. The quota system is the only way they can break free” .

Part Five: Conclusion

Affirmative Action is viewed as one of the most effective social policies in building more equitable society. Many people have accessed to higher education, enable them to have decent jobs and boost self-confidence. AA may not a perfect policy but it is widely reported it has brought millions of people out of the extreme poverty.

However, it is still divided among the supporters and critics of AA. The two groups cannot agree whether affirmative action make things better or worse. One thing is certain - the debate rages on.

References:

Anis A. Dani and Arjan de Haan (editors), “Inclusive States: Social Policy and Structural Inequalities”, The World Bank, 2008.

Ashwini Deshpande, “EQUITY & DEVELOPMENT: Affirmative Action in India and the United States”, World Development Report 2006. (Paper available at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/Affirmative_Action_India_Ashwini.pdf)

Harish C. Jain, Peter J. Sloane, and Frank M. Horwitz, “Employment Equity and Affirmative Action: An International Comparison”, M.E.Sharpe, USA, 2003.

Jan Schapper and Prue Burns, “The Ethical Case for Affirmative Action”, Journal of Business Ethics (2008), Springer 2007.

Nic Paton, “Accentuate the Positive”, Personnel Today, 4 November 2008.
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Towards a better union in Myanmar

0 comments Friday, March 7, 2014

By: Matthew J Walton:

The 67th anniversary of Union Day has come and gone, marking the 1947 Panglong Conference that brought together Burman, Shan, Kachin, and Chin political leaders and formed the basis for an independent Burma. The "Spirit of Panglong" - its meanings, failures, and promises - haunts the country's current peace talks, which, despite seeming progress in recent weeks with a common position from the ethnic armed groups' negotiating team, could remain stalled if the military refuses to accept a ceasefire agreement that also contains detailed language and timeframes for future political discussions.
 
At a time like this, with many people calling for a "Second Panglong," it is useful to look back at the history of the Panglong Conference to examine its dynamics and effects, in order to draw lessons for nation-building in contemporary Myanmar. This article briefly considers 10 lessons from Panglong and their significance for the current peace process, as well as two broader lessons drawn from post-conflict peace-building around the world in the hope of fostering more critical dialogue about Panglong, what it was, what it wasn't, and how it is relevant today.

1. Get it in writing
The Panglong Agreement included the promise that "full autonomy is agreed to in principle." This was a rather vague clause that wasn't actually included in the 1947 constitution implemented after achieving independence from colonial rule under the British. Many non-Burman leaders who attended the conference trusted independence hero General Aung San and hoped that he would honor the informal promises he made to them, such as "If Burma gets one kyat, you will get one kyat."

Unfortunately his assassination in 1947 meant that he never had a chance to do this. Although this wasn't always the case, contemporary political groups seem to have gradually learned this lesson and even the least fruitful ceasefire negotiations these days seem to end with some sort of written agreement, if only an understanding to continue meeting. These written documents will be absolutely necessary to hold parties accountable in the future, both domestically and internationally.

2. Implementation matters
Written agreements are important, but there must also be agreement on how they will be implemented, especially as the legal status of an agreement might not always be clearly enforceable. The 1947 constitution wasn't exactly a federal constitution, but it wasn't necessarily inconsistent with a federal structure. The constitution was implemented in a unitary way, which betrayed the expectations of non-Burman groups. It's also important to note that there have been a number of written ceasefire agreements signed by the Myanmar government and military over the years, many of which have been broken. A written agreement is necessary, but of course not sufficient to ensure that both parties will follow through.

For current political discussions, it will be important to be clear about who will be responsible for implementation. What types of oversight will there be after an agreement and who will enforce it? Additionally, while the wording of any document is important, it will also be necessary to consider whether or not the parties have similar understandings of the intent of the agreements. Assumptions about these key questions resulted in disappointment with the way the Panglong Agreement was incorporated into the 1947 constitution and the way that constitution was implemented.

Additionally, participants will need to consider enforcement mechanisms. If the Tatmadaw or an ethnic armed group violates the terms of a ceasefire, what will the penalty be? Will it be enough to ensure compliance? At a time when Western governments have been dropping or suspending sanctions left and right and encouraging massive aid and investment, it might be prudent to consider explicitly tying some of those benefits to a ceasefire in order to encourage all parties to honor their agreements.

3. Trust is critical …
There was actually another multi-ethnic gathering that took place at Panglong several months before the more famous Panglong Conference. This was an important opportunity used by non-Burman leaders to build trust among themselves. General Aung San had also been traveling around the country in the year leading up to the conference and many non-Burman accounts also reflect a growing trust in his willingness to listen to and consider non-Burman concerns.

A contemporary political settlement would need to acknowledge the difficult truth that this kind of trust does not exist in Myanmar today. After decades of civil conflict, most non-Burman groups do not trust the government or the military, with good reason. Additionally, military divide-and-conquer tactics as well as the failures of various attempted united fronts have eroded trust between many non-Burman groups, making negotiations more complicated. While recognizing the advantages in bargaining collectively, non-Burman groups should not give in to the temptation to suppress dissenting viewpoints within their own ranks in order to present a united front; similarly, neither the government nor the international community should expect or demand a single, unitary "ethnic minority" perspective.

4. …but don't rely on individuals
Many of the non-Burman leaders gradually came to trust General Aung San and, whatever his actual intentions were, when he was assassinated the country was left without a mediating figure. Much of the mainstream media coverage surrounding the current peace talks suggests that many non-Burman leaders have a growing respect for President's Office Minister U Aung Min and trust that he will be a fair negotiator; U Aung Min has also stated this himself. Yet there are several reasons to be concerned with this assumption.

First, there are enough conflicting reports about attitudes towards U Aung Min to suggest that claims that he enjoys the complete trust of the non-Burman groups are overstated. Second, when it comes to a ceasefire (and a possible future political settlement), even though U Aung Min has been appointed as chief negotiator, the military will still likely make any final decisions. Finally, it cannot be known what any individual's true intentions are, what will happen in the next few years, or what U Aung Min's role will be in a future government. All of this makes it very dangerous to rely on an individual in this sort of situation. The best assurance is to design representative, inclusive, and adaptable institutional frameworks that are not reliant on particular charismatic individuals.

5. Language matters
As Chin scholar Lian Sakhong has explained, the Chin delegation was at a disadvantage during the Panglong Conference because they did not have a translator who was familiar with their particular dialect. The British administrator who they were expecting to act as translator was recalled several weeks earlier (there is some debate as to whether he resigned or was fired). Additionally, even though the Shan and Kachin delegates were more familiar with the Burmese language, they were not very well versed in more advanced concepts in constitutional law or the kinds of political settlements that might result in the autonomy they hoped for.

Although political awareness and knowledge has definitely increased among non-Burman communities in the decades since independence, any future negotiations should take into consideration the fact that most non-Burmans will be participating in negotiations using a language that is often not their mother tongue. This is not meant to be a demeaning comment on their abilities to speak Burmese, but simply a reminder that native language status can confer a more powerful bargaining position in negotiations like this; a critical element of negotiations will be the opportunity for non-Burman delegations to evaluate and fine tune the language of any agreements.

More importantly, national political discourse in Myanmar has not only taken place using the Burmese language, but also using predominantly Burman conceptions of politics. If discussions about the future political structure of Myanmar were to take into account, for example, the ways in which Karen and Burman conceptions of "justice" differ from one another or the ways in which Kachin notions of community, family ties and mutual obligations are different from Burman understandings, it could have several positive effects.

First, it would help facilitate agreement on the intent of specific agreements (as mentioned above) by navigating through these different conceptual frameworks. Second, it could provide creative new avenues for political discussion, as non-Burman ideas and practices of politics would become a part of the national dialogue. And, finally, it would contribute to a feeling of inclusion in the state, where non-Burmans might see insights from their own political and social traditions valued as part of a broader national discourse.

6. Inclusion matters
Although Myanmar school textbooks portray Panglong as the moment when all of the country's ethnic groups came together to declare their intentions to join together in a union, the signatories to the agreement were only a few Burman, Shan, Kachin, and Chin leaders. The British required General Aung San to get agreement from the "Frontier Areas," the administrative region of the country that comprised the border areas. While this area was occupied by more than just the Shan, Kachin, and Chin, other groups were excluded for a number of reasons, many of which have been explained by historians and analysts. Beyond the groups that were specifically excluded, many marginalized populations within the Burmans, Shan, Kachin, and Chin were not a part of the discussions.

The question of inclusion will be critical for future political discussions. Who will be included? Who will have the authority to decide who is included? Inter-personal rivalries have often inhibited pan-ethnic solidarity and they have also had an influence on who has been included in recent peace talks and political discussions. How can we determine if certain groups are representative of the populations they claim to represent? Women's groups, for example, have conducted important research and advocacy campaigns in conflict zones, in addition to providing basic services for people in need. However, they have more often than not been excluded from the current peace talks and from most political negotiations between the Burman-led government and non-Burman groups; exclusion like this is absolutely unacceptable given the critical and constructive role of women in building peace in Myanmar and helping to create a more just society.

The initial Panglong Conference sought to bring together different ethnic groups and the assumption is that a future political settlement would also be along ethnic lines. This, however, will not be sufficient in dealing with the wide range of identities and identity conflicts that exist in present day Myanmar. Although it would certainly make the discussions more challenging and complex, the conversation needs to include marginalized populations beyond ethnic groups. These include religious minorities, sexual minorities, and under-represented socio-economic interests, just to name a few.

Additionally, are there Burman groups and perspectives that ought to be included beyond the government, the military, and maybe a few of the prominent democratic opposition groups? What about other identities that are not easily captured by the "ethnic" framework, such as Sino-Myanmar, Burmese of Indian descent, or the Rohingya? While some Burmese may find this suggestion unreasonable, Myanmar's recent history of political exclusion has gone well beyond ethnic identity and a national effort that will contribute to peace and reconciliation must consider the dynamics of marginalization beyond ethnicity.

7. Power dynamics matter
The general political climate at the time of the Panglong Conference was one in which it was clear that the British wished to negotiate a transition to independence as quickly as possible while minimally honoring obligations to their non-Burman allies. This meant that they were willing to work primarily with General Aung San, which gave him a much stronger bargaining position at the conference. Even on the non-Burman side, the negotiations at Panglong were complicated by the prominent role played by hereditary leaders such as the Shan saophas (sawbwas) and Kachin duwas, who enjoyed a high degree of traditional legitimacy.

Those concerned with the ways in which power dynamics can silence marginalized voices ought to be asking a number of questions regarding the organization of future political discussions. What will the structure of the meeting(s) be? Where will they take place? What will be the methods of discussion? Will they privilege men or older people, as is common in Myanmar society? Will they privilege those with Western education, fluency in English, or law and politics degrees? In essence, these questions boil down to one: who gets to assess what is and is not a valuable contribution to the discussion process?

While the discussion currently seems to revolve around degrees of political and economic autonomy for non-Burman states, how will minority groups be treated more generally? This refers not only to ethnic minorities in Burman divisions, but also to non-Burman minorities in other states, such as the Shan population living in Kachin State. Attention to power dynamics will also force participants to contend with an uncomfortable question: How much bargaining power do non-Burman groups really have in the current political situation?

While there is undoubtedly pressure on the government and the military to address the "ethnic" issue in Myanmar, international actors are putting equal, if not greater, pressure on non-Burman groups to seize the current opportunity and sign agreements, no matter how unsatisfactory they may be. Many non-Burman leaders at the first Panglong Conference underestimated the degree to which the British were eager to end their colonial involvement in Burma; current leaders cannot make the same mistake and international actors ought to be encouraging a process that pays attention to power inequalities and the demands of justice.

Power dynamics also matter in assessing where real decision-making authority lies. Can U Aung Min and his negotiating team make credible commitments on behalf of the government and the Tatmadaw? Will the military agree to abide by the terms of a ceasefire and what is its promise worth considering they have violated agreements in the past? Persistent fears about the degree to which the military is invested in the process of political negotiation also strengthen the hand of the government side. Government negotiators can present themselves as the "good guys," attempting to blunt potential roadblocks from the military while also pressing non-Burman groups to give in and accept a one-sided "compromise."

8. Take your time
General Aung San understood that the British wanted to wash their hands of the situation in Burma after World War II and took advantage of that fact to push for immediate independence. Not only did this put pressure on the non-Burman groups to acquiesce quickly to an agreement, it also resulted in a rather undemocratic process. For example, given the small window of opportunity to get agreement from the Frontier Areas leaders to join the Union of Burma, Aung San's political party, the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League), chose to work primarily with the hereditary leaders who enjoyed greater standing in the eyes of the British administration rather than more democratically-inclined allies such as the Shan State People's Freedom League and the Kachin Youth League.

The current situation has many similar elements. While both the Myanmar government and many of the non-Burman political and armed groups have become more democratic over time, there are still many individuals and organizations within these communities that have been pushing for more transparency, inclusiveness, and democratic decision-making. However, with the pressure to get a "quick win" before the 2015 elections, it is likely that a slower, more consultative process will be passed over in favor of a settlement that wins the approval of international observers, but doesn't effectively respond to the concerns non-Burmans have expressed over the years.

Additionally, the growing sentiment in the international community that there is a fast-closing window of opportunity for political negotiation puts greater pressure on non-Burman groups to come to the table, even when the offerings from the government side are less than ideal. This discourse (which is also reinforced by some members of non-Burman groups seeking to push for peace and a quick settlement) paints reluctant groups and individuals as "spoilers" who are inhibiting the chances for peace.

The spoiler discourse is dangerous, especially since the concerns raised by some of those who are now labeled as "spoilers" are the same concerns many non-Burmans have expressed consistently over the past few decades. The risk is that the pressure to come to an agreement in time for the electoral benefits to pay off in 2015 will result in a flawed settlement that legitimizes a hastily negotiated and non-representative agreement. Domestic and international groups who claim to be supporting "democratic development" in Myanmar need to recognize the potentially destructive effects of this pressure and to support instead a more thoughtful, inclusive process.

9. Acknowledge the difficult history
The Panglong Conference took place only a few years after World War II had ended in Burma. This was a war that initially saw mostly Burmans allied with the Japanese fighting against mostly non-Burmans allied with the British. Near the end of the war, the Burmans abruptly switched sides, joining with the British-led Allies to drive the Japanese out of the country. The complexities of this conflict and the lingering hostilities went almost completely unexamined at Panglong.

No one discussed, for example, the atrocities committed by Burman and Karen troops against each other's civilian populations (probably because the Karen weren't a part of the Panglong negotiations, but there were other examples). No one raised the ways in which the pre-war nationalist movement was configured in part against non-Burmans as allies of the oppressive colonial authority, the flare-ups of violence directed at non-Burman and non-Buddhist populations in the 1930s, or the ways in which the British had used non-Burman troops to quell Burman rebellions. Panglong didn't address the underlying tensions between the groups that were about to form an independent nation, and as a result there was no basis for sticking together once those tensions and grievances resurfaced.

Political discussions in the current period not only need to acknowledge the complex pre-independence history of opposition and mistrust, they also have to honestly engage with the subsequent decades of civil conflict and oppression experienced by the vast majority of Myanmar's population. The trust-building that will be necessary to facilitate stability and growth cannot occur without recognition of this history. The most challenging element of this acknowledgement will be on the side of the Tatmadaw. Present and past military leaders are justifiably terrified of the possibility of one day being tried for war crimes or crimes against humanity (and it's likely that some leaders of non-state armed groups might fall into this category as well) and there is a range of opinions inside and outside of Myanmar as to what justice might look like in this transitional context (tribunals, truth commissions, public apologies, etc.).

The frank truth of the matter is that the Tatmadaw holds most of the cards; the military will likely resist any efforts at uncovering past or present abuses and the international community has so far shown no inclination towards concerted action that would bring this about. Perhaps the best place to begin is through all sides honestly engaging with a harsh and brutal history of exclusion and violence. Could the military be appealed to on the grounds of its own supposed dedication to the nation?

Its current leaders have been using language that suggests they view their present incarnation as a different institution not to be judged by past actions, but this would definitely not be a sufficient response in a reconciliation process. Would more honest self-reflection on the part of the military (without the threat of punishment) be enough to satisfy its tens of millions of victims? There will likely be conflicting answers to these questions, but a crucial lesson from Panglong is that unacknowledged grievances will not stay hidden forever.

10. Accept that there is no "Union Spirit" or "Panglong Spirit"
This is perhaps the most controversial of the lessons that emerge from Panglong. An examination of the accounts of the conference reveals that the Shan, Kachin, and Chin joined the Union for primarily economic and instrumental reasons. Most of these leaders remained skeptical of the degree to which they would actually be incorporated into the Union as equals (indeed, some were unsure whether they wanted this themselves).

It is even difficult to attribute to the AFPFL leaders the type of "Union Spirit" that is celebrated in Myanmar's textbooks since the British required that they gain the agreement of the Frontier Areas in order to achieve independence. All of this suggests that there was no "Union Spirit" at the time of the Panglong Agreement, and that furthermore the waves of ideological, religious, and ethnic rebellions that occurred in the years following independence provide additional proof that Panglong did not succeed in creating that spirit.

While official versions of the history honor Panglong as an expression of "Union Spirit", it must be acknowledged that the decades of civil conflict in Myanmar that followed independence represent strong evidence of the lack of this spirit in the country. Many groups never felt themselves to be a part of the Burmese nation after independence and have pointed to formal policies of discrimination as well as informal methods of exclusion from full membership in the national community.

Proclamations from the government and the military that insist not only on the foundational presence of "Union Spirit" but also on the duty of every citizen to cherish and safeguard it only further reinforce the view of many non-Burmans that the government does not take their concerns seriously. One way to recognize this fact would be for the government to acknowledge that "Union Spirit" is something that needs to be actively constructed through trust-building over a period of time. Without recognition of the present emptiness of "Union Spirit", political settlements are unlikely to address the deep divides that inhibit national reconciliation.

Beyond Panglong
Soldiers shouldn't lead political negotiations

There are multiple modern examples (the Balkans Spring of 1941 comes to mind) of the negative long term effects of war fighters serving as the sole voices in both peace talks and subsequent political settlements. Their interests are primarily in military matters and beyond that in maintaining economic and political power and in some cases control over territory. Inclusive participatory negotiations are generally not first in the minds of those who have been engaged in prolonged armed conflict. This is not necessarily a criticism as much as an observation of the dynamics of peace talks led by fighters.

In Myanmar there is the further complication that virtually every armed group in the country has been involved in various atrocities, committed against each other in violation of laws of war, but more importantly against civilian populations. This means that every one of the armed groups involved in the peace talks has an incentive to avoid transparent and detailed engagement with questions related to war crimes and abuses committed against civilians.

If their voices are the only ones helping to create a peace settlement, they may very well close off opportunities for addressing critical questions of justice that would be a necessary component of reconciliation, both between and within different ethnic groups. Not only do groups and individuals with grievances against both the Tatmadaw and non-state armed groups need to be involved, these dynamics also highlight the importance of participation by Tatmadaw officers themselves as a way of acknowledging past wrongs and moving towards a common understanding of both national and human security concerns.

"Equality" won't correct years of institutionalized inequality

Decades of centralized control supported by military might has meant that, despite living in resource-rich areas of the country, most non-Burmans have not seen the benefits of economic development. In places where the government or military have not been able to monopolize resource extraction, other strongmen have stepped in to reap the rewards. There may be a strand of logic in the military argument that they have deployed their forces predominantly in non-Burman border states because those have been the regions with active armed rebellions, but whatever the motivation, the result has been persistent militarization and poverty for the populations of those regions. These factors, combined with a lack of educational or economic opportunities have made it more likely that people will remain in a cycle of poverty and marginalization.

Political settlements in these areas will have to acknowledge this fact and provide more than just guarantees of "equality" for non-Burmans in the country. While overt ethnic discrimination may be declining in Myanmar, notwithstanding the recent violent persecution of the ethnic Rohingya, a lasting peace could easily be hindered by an insufficient response to entrenched privilege and institutionalized inequality. To put it simply, populations that have suffered disproportionately over the past decades will need a more active, interventionist state to help level the playing field.

If Myanmar is to have a more inclusive state with something approaching equality of opportunity, it will require policies of affirmative action that explicitly give benefits to historically disadvantaged populations, including, but not limited to, those based on ethnicity. These might include more spending on education both in non-Burman languages and in non-Burman areas more generally, reserved seats in universities and in the civil service, preferential hiring to ensure that development projects actually improve the livelihoods of local populations, or a national government body to assess and provide redress for civil rights violations.

Of course, these policies would also need to be adaptable, in order to respond to changing dynamics of opportunity and inequality. Developing these policies will primarily be the responsibility of the Myanmar government, but the international community can play a role in being sensitive to these dynamics both in the distribution of aid and, more importantly, in investment in the country.

Conclusions
Myanmar's leaders and citizens have many global models to draw on in facilitating national reconciliation, post-conflict transformation, and a gradual move towards federalism and increased regional autonomy. Yet an event like Panglong still retains a pull on the national imagination, as much for what it could represent as for what it actually was. Even though many groups have advocated for a "Second Panglong" that would move toward a political settlement of ethnic conflict, such a "conference" might still fall short of being an effective vehicle for creating harmony and stability in the country, even if it were more inclusive.

Instead of considering a single Second Panglong Conference, Panglong Spirit could be recognized as something that needs to be continually and actively constructed. This would mean envisioning "Panglong" as more of an ongoing, institutionalized process than an event. It could consist of meetings at regular intervals and at various levels. Some of these meetings might be "safe" spaces where groups could air their grievances freely and others would simply be mutual teaching, where disparate groups learn about and learn to respect each other's histories, customs, and aspirations. Some could bring together different groups to identify common experiences and goals as well as points of disagreement, while others would be designed to bring those grievances and suggestions directly to policy makers and implementers. The latter aspect is critical to ensuring that these conversations, while gradually building trust and identifying common interests, were also regularly engaging with government officials in a position to alter policy.

The "agenda" for each meeting might vary based on local circumstances, yet there might also be a national "coordinating" committee that would ensure that different identity groups are sufficiently represented and also that divergence of opinion within those groups is recognized and not suppressed. The participants themselves - and the various communities and identities that would be represented - would also change over time, as certain grievances and inequalities are addressed and others emerge. The discussions and conclusions of meetings could be disseminated in multiple languages, fostering greater national understanding of the challenges facing different communities, but also helping to hold the government accountable for actually channeling grievances from the meetings into concrete policy changes.

A model like this could only work with acknowledgement from the Myanmar government that the "Panglong Spirit" is not something that ever really existed among the population nor (and this part is very important) something that will ever be fully realized. This is, in fact, the very reason why a single event would never be sufficient for developing a more inclusive political system. The nature of governments to view and categorize people in convenient ways and the tendency to see national identity as something primordial and given means that some individuals and groups will always find themselves outside of the national community.

Justice does not necessarily demand that every group be included, but it does demand that every grievance be considered. In the case of Myanmar, the lens of justice must be adaptable enough to look beyond ethnicity and to recognize the repression of difference within and by groups that are themselves oppressed. By seeing the creation of the Panglong Spirit as something aspirational and continually in need of re-assessment, the people of Myanmar have a unique opportunity to acknowledge the country's exclusionary past and to develop and institutionalize a system that would accommodate the changing nature of national identity, build trust between estranged groups, and create a more inclusive and just union.

Matthew J Walton is the Aung San Suu Kyi Senior Research Fellow in Modern Burmese Studies at St Antony's College, University of Oxford. He is also a consultant for The Elders on their engagement in Myanmar.
http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-02-070314.html
(Copyright 2014 Matthew J Walton)  (7 March 2014)
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Myanmar Peace Process: International Donors Wasting Tax Payers' Money?

0 comments Thursday, March 6, 2014
The ceasefire negotiations with ethnic rebel groups started soon after Thein Sein government came into power in 2011. Not many people know that there has been no official budget for such important task which is necessary for lasting peace in Myanmar. Thanks to international community (i.e., Japan, EU, and U.S) have been the major sponsors for peace efforts.

By now, multimillion dollar was spent. But after two years of negotiations, lasting peace is still elusive as the Burmese military forces continue attacks against Kachin Independence Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and Shan State Army - North which just had ceasefire agreement in 2012.

I wonder if Japanese, European and American tax payers ever wonder how their tax money is spent in Myanmar. As at now, the only people who are benefiting from this so-called peace efforts seem to be the mediators. Rumors have been floating that members of Myanmar Peace Center (MPC), the key mediating group, are enjoying monthly salary of USD 10,000. The ethnic rebel leaders who entered ceasefire deals with the government also enjoy lavish gifts including import car licenses that are worth of multimillion dollar. Given that the government has no budget for peace process, it is interesting where this money comes from. 

Many agree that the peace process is not progressing enough because international community chooses to ignore the ethnic rebel groups with a notion of empowering young Thein Sein government. The flaw of this notion is that it fails to recognize the fact that without comprehensive political agreement between ethnic Bamar (majority group) and ethnic minorities, there will be no democracy or peace. I am sorry but it is true.

Thein Sein government has been telling international community that nation wide ceasefire agreement will be signed soon. This will not happen until international community has gut to push Burmese military and the government to have meaningful political negations with ethnic groups. Otherwise, multimillion dollar donation for peace process will be a total waste!

Zung Ring
Zungring@gmail.com
6 March 2014
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Ceasefire Capitalism

0 comments Wednesday, March 5, 2014
Why Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government emissaries talking peace. 

In early November, negotiators from the Burmese government traveled to the northern town of Myitkyina to confer with representatives from a conglomeration of ethnic rebel groups. It was the first time in decades of warfare that government officials sat down with the combined leadership of Burma's rebel movements, inspiring praise from the United Nations. 

But the optimistic news coverage neglected to question the presence of another interest group at the meeting: the Chinese. With billions of dollars invested in energy, mining, and logging projects in Kachin state, China has a lot at stake in the outcome of this conflict, which has threatened its access to the area's abundant resources. Its involvement served as a palpable reminder (as if anyone needed it) that peace talks between the government and ethnic rebels aren't just about political differences. They're also very much about business. 

That's a hard truth that's all too often neglected in coverage of the continuing efforts to find a practical agenda for peace. China is but one of many players in the scramble to capitalize on the fantastically abundant natural resources in Burma's border regions, which run the gamut from teak to minerals to hydropower, not to mention Kachin state's $8 billion jade industry. The Burmese government used past ceasefires as an opportunity to plunder areas inhabited by local ethnic groups, prompting additional armed conflict while complicating efforts to resolve it. Indeed, the government's recent reform push may be attempting to do the same thing. All signs suggest that the government is hoping to exploit the bounty of Burma's periphery as it opens to foreign investment. 

This issue is one of the primary irritants underlying the government's fight with the rebels in Kachin state. Among Burma's many ethnic groups, the Kachin have particular experience with the Burmese government's malformed "peace." In 1994, the government managed to broker a peace agreement that ended decades of civil war. But the ceasefire did not mean that the regime began to take the Kachin's interests into consideration. During the 17-year ceasefire period, the Kachin watched as their state was carved up and sold to regime-aligned corporations -- usually with little benefit to the people who lived there. 

Following the 1994 deal, Burmese and Chinese firms moved in to control the local economy, whittling small businesses down to nothing, and bringing in thousands of migrant workers who forced the Kachin out of jobs. The influx of migrant workers and rising poverty rates had a corrosive effect on Kachin society. At the same time, the Kachin's land was cordoned off for corporate exploitation. Nearly 20 percent of the state's land was allocated for mining, while nearly 200,000 acres of land in the Hukawng Valley Tiger Reserve were set aside for biofuel crops. Shortly after the 1994 agreement, the government rolled out plans to build seven dams along the N'Mai and Mali Rivers to be financed by China. When they are completed, most of the output will go to China, ignoring local energy needs. This will only ramp up anti-business feelings among the Kachin. 

And in 1994, the exploitation of the ceasefire didn't stop at business. The Burmese army used the ceasefire period to bolster its presence in Kachin state. This meant that when the Burmese troops launched an assault on Kachin rebels in June 2011 -- intentionally rekindling the war -- they had a strategic advantage. Battalions were already stationed en masse across the state, ready to widen the conflict. Moreover, because the ceasefire had blurred territorial boundaries, government troops were able to block fleeing civilians reentering rebel-controlled areas. In the face of violent conflict, these civilians could not get home. This nightmare scenario continues today, as evidenced by the thousands of civilians who fled after fresh clashes broke out less than a fortnight ago. Conversely then, the ceasefire period allowed greater militarization of the region, and eroded the security of its people.

It's no coincidence then that the Kachin faction is reluctant to sign a deal before knowing what the Burmese government plans for the state's resources. Doing so may presage a repeat of the destructive business practices that have steadily eaten away at the state. The Kachin have noted the eerie parallels between this round of talks and those in 1994. The presence of Chinese observers at this week's ceasefire talks suggests that Beijing's interests in the outcome of the conflict are as pressing as they were 20 years ago. Despite various rounds of talks this year where the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) pressed the government to come clean on its plans for the state after the proposed ceasefire, the two sides have continually failed to cement a political deal that would demarcate territory and delegate rights to resources. 

For an ethnic group that has long called for autonomy, the prospect of another ceasefire without a political resolution to these chronic problems is unthinkable. In that respect, foreign governments who used the Myanmar Peace Center -- widely considered a mascot for the government's reformist agenda -- to hurry ethnic armies into laying down their arms either do not understand the source of the Kachin's reluctance, or are practicing willful, perhaps even strategic, denial. Burma's border regions have a reputation as a final untapped energy market, and that is a tough incentive to ignore.

If the Kachin had any doubts that the government is prioritizing business, last year's talks in Karen state would dispel them. In early 2012, the government was able to hammer out a ceasefire agreement with the Karen National Union (KNU) following decades of conflict -- but only by encouraging pro-business Karen officials to deviate from the more hard-line faction. These pro-business officials agreed to open a liaison office in exchange for development assistance that would open the door to large-scale investment in the region, which is rich in gold, hydropower, and possibly even shale gas.

This same pro-business group participated in ceasefire talks with the government in 2011 that included delegates from Dawei Princess, a local partner in a massive deep-sea port project under construction close to the Karen's territory. The delegates were invited despite resistance from the KNU. The make-up of these early meetings offered an early indication of the business dimension to the ceasefire talks. 

Opening the doors for foreign development has had serious consequences for the people of Karen state. A 2012 report by Physicians for Human Rights spotlighted the link between extractive projects and rights abuses in the region. It warned that people who lived near a dam, pipeline, or mine were "almost eight times more likely to have been forced to work for the army and over six times more likely to have been uprooted or had restrictions placed on their travel." (A useful National Geographic map offers visual evidence for this.) The half a million people displaced by war in eastern Burma hope to return to their land soon, but as the Kachin who returned after the 1994 ceasefire found, this land may now belong to someone else. 

Rather than working to compromise with the KNU, the government decided to open a fissure in the one entity that commands respect across Karen society. The Burmese government may have won a flimsy ceasefire, but the prospects for lasting peace in a region familiar with the duplicity and abusive tactics of the Burmese army are slim. 

On top of all this, the parliament passed a new foreign investment law earlier this year that offers attractive incentives for business in Burma. It also conveniently places the regulation of harmful practices in the hands of the Burmese government, which has historically shown no inclination toward responsible investment. It is likely that companies will be free to operate in the same way they have for years, and with the same consequences. 

Everyone from corporate clients, to foreign governments, to the Burmese military seems to be entering the fray to advocate for what Kevin Woods calls "ceasefire capitalism" -- that familiar shadowy nexus of military, political, and business elites that has dominated Burma's economy for 50 years, exploiting periods of calm to assert control over land. Everyone, that is, except for the ethnic groups at the center of these talks. It certainly seems that Burma is in danger of repeating history by tainting its peace negotiations with the interests of those who do not prioritize peace. Away from the optimistic talk greeting the ceasefire negotiations lies the ugly side of the reform process. All told, civilians face many of the same dangers they did during wartime. 

BY: Francis Wade, 5 December 2013.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/afghanistan_karzai_bilateral_security
 

Why Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government emissaries talking peace - See more at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/ceasefire_capitalism#sthash.rFzmtQJS.dpuf
Why Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government emissaries talking peace - See more at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/ceasefire_capitalism#sthash.rFzmtQJS.dpuf
Why Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government emissaries talking peace - See more at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/ceasefire_capitalism#sthash.rFzmtQJS.dpuf
Ceasefire Capitalism
Why Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government emissaries talking peace.
- See more at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/ceasefire_capitalism#sthash.rFzmtQJS.dpuf
Ceasefire Capitalism
Why Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government emissaries talking peace.
- See more at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/ceasefire_capitalism#sthash.rFzmtQJS.dpuf
Ceasefire Capitalism
Why Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government emissaries talking peace.
- See more at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/ceasefire_capitalism#sthash.rFzmtQJS.dpuf
Ceasefire Capitalism
Why Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government emissaries talking peace.
- See more at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/ceasefire_capitalism#sthash.rFzmtQJS.dpuf
Ceasefire Capitalism
Why Burma's rebels have every reason to be suspicious of government emissaries talking peace.
- See more at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/29/ceasefire_capitalism#sthash.rFzmtQJS.dpuf
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Oh Happy Day!