By:
Matthew J Walton:
The
67th anniversary of Union Day has come and gone, marking the 1947 Panglong
Conference that brought together Burman, Shan, Kachin, and Chin political
leaders and formed the basis for an independent Burma. The "Spirit of
Panglong" - its meanings, failures, and promises - haunts the country's
current peace talks, which, despite seeming progress in recent weeks with a
common position from the ethnic armed groups' negotiating team, could remain
stalled if the military refuses to accept a ceasefire agreement that also
contains detailed language and timeframes for future political discussions.
At
a time like this, with many people calling for a "Second Panglong,"
it is useful to look back at the history of the Panglong Conference to examine
its dynamics and effects, in order to draw lessons for nation-building in
contemporary Myanmar. This article briefly considers 10 lessons from Panglong
and their significance for the current peace process, as well as two broader
lessons drawn from post-conflict peace-building around the world in the hope of
fostering more critical dialogue about Panglong, what it was, what it wasn't,
and how it is relevant today.
1.
Get it in writing
The
Panglong Agreement included the promise that "full autonomy is agreed to
in principle." This was a rather vague clause that wasn't actually
included in the 1947 constitution implemented after achieving independence from
colonial rule under the British. Many non-Burman leaders who attended the
conference trusted independence hero General Aung San and hoped that he would
honor the informal promises he made to them, such as "If Burma gets one
kyat, you will get one kyat."
Unfortunately
his assassination in 1947 meant that he never had a chance to do this. Although
this wasn't always the case, contemporary political groups seem to have
gradually learned this lesson and even the least fruitful ceasefire
negotiations these days seem to end with some sort of written agreement, if
only an understanding to continue meeting. These written documents will be
absolutely necessary to hold parties accountable in the future, both
domestically and internationally.
2.
Implementation matters
Written
agreements are important, but there must also be agreement on how they will be
implemented, especially as the legal status of an agreement might not always be
clearly enforceable. The 1947 constitution wasn't exactly a federal
constitution, but it wasn't necessarily inconsistent with a federal structure.
The constitution was implemented in a unitary way, which betrayed the
expectations of non-Burman groups. It's also important to note that there have
been a number of written ceasefire agreements signed by the Myanmar government
and military over the years, many of which have been broken. A written
agreement is necessary, but of course not sufficient to ensure that both
parties will follow through.
For
current political discussions, it will be important to be clear about who will
be responsible for implementation. What types of oversight will there be after
an agreement and who will enforce it? Additionally, while the wording of any
document is important, it will also be necessary to consider whether or not the
parties have similar understandings of the intent of the agreements.
Assumptions about these key questions resulted in disappointment with the way
the Panglong Agreement was incorporated into the 1947 constitution and the way
that constitution was implemented.
Additionally,
participants will need to consider enforcement mechanisms. If the Tatmadaw or
an ethnic armed group violates the terms of a ceasefire, what will the penalty
be? Will it be enough to ensure compliance? At a time when Western governments
have been dropping or suspending sanctions left and right and encouraging
massive aid and investment, it might be prudent to consider explicitly tying
some of those benefits to a ceasefire in order to encourage all parties to
honor their agreements.
3.
Trust is critical …
There
was actually another multi-ethnic gathering that took place at Panglong several
months before the more famous Panglong Conference. This was an important
opportunity used by non-Burman leaders to build trust among themselves. General
Aung San had also been traveling around the country in the year leading up to
the conference and many non-Burman accounts also reflect a growing trust in his
willingness to listen to and consider non-Burman concerns.
A
contemporary political settlement would need to acknowledge the difficult truth
that this kind of trust does not exist in Myanmar today. After decades of civil
conflict, most non-Burman groups do not trust the government or the military,
with good reason. Additionally, military divide-and-conquer tactics as well as
the failures of various attempted united fronts have eroded trust between many
non-Burman groups, making negotiations more complicated. While recognizing the
advantages in bargaining collectively, non-Burman groups should not give in to
the temptation to suppress dissenting viewpoints within their own ranks in
order to present a united front; similarly, neither the government nor the
international community should expect or demand a single, unitary "ethnic
minority" perspective.
4.
…but don't rely on individuals
Many
of the non-Burman leaders gradually came to trust General Aung San and,
whatever his actual intentions were, when he was assassinated the country was
left without a mediating figure. Much of the mainstream media coverage
surrounding the current peace talks suggests that many non-Burman leaders have
a growing respect for President's Office Minister U Aung Min and trust that he
will be a fair negotiator; U Aung Min has also stated this himself. Yet there
are several reasons to be concerned with this assumption.
First,
there are enough conflicting reports about attitudes towards U Aung Min to
suggest that claims that he enjoys the complete trust of the non-Burman groups
are overstated. Second, when it comes to a ceasefire (and a possible future
political settlement), even though U Aung Min has been appointed as chief
negotiator, the military will still likely make any final decisions. Finally,
it cannot be known what any individual's true intentions are, what will happen
in the next few years, or what U Aung Min's role will be in a future
government. All of this makes it very dangerous to rely on an individual in
this sort of situation. The best assurance is to design representative,
inclusive, and adaptable institutional frameworks that are not reliant on
particular charismatic individuals.
5.
Language matters
As
Chin scholar Lian Sakhong has explained, the Chin delegation was at a
disadvantage during the Panglong Conference because they did not have a
translator who was familiar with their particular dialect. The British
administrator who they were expecting to act as translator was recalled several
weeks earlier (there is some debate as to whether he resigned or was fired).
Additionally, even though the Shan and Kachin delegates were more familiar with
the Burmese language, they were not very well versed in more advanced concepts
in constitutional law or the kinds of political settlements that might result
in the autonomy they hoped for.
Although
political awareness and knowledge has definitely increased among non-Burman
communities in the decades since independence, any future negotiations should
take into consideration the fact that most non-Burmans will be participating in
negotiations using a language that is often not their mother tongue. This is
not meant to be a demeaning comment on their abilities to speak Burmese, but
simply a reminder that native language status can confer a more powerful
bargaining position in negotiations like this; a critical element of
negotiations will be the opportunity for non-Burman delegations to evaluate and
fine tune the language of any agreements.
More
importantly, national political discourse in Myanmar has not only taken place
using the Burmese language, but also using predominantly Burman conceptions of
politics. If discussions about the future political structure of Myanmar were
to take into account, for example, the ways in which Karen and Burman
conceptions of "justice" differ from one another or the ways in which
Kachin notions of community, family ties and mutual obligations are different
from Burman understandings, it could have several positive effects.
First,
it would help facilitate agreement on the intent of specific agreements (as
mentioned above) by navigating through these different conceptual frameworks.
Second, it could provide creative new avenues for political discussion, as
non-Burman ideas and practices of politics would become a part of the national
dialogue. And, finally, it would contribute to a feeling of inclusion in the
state, where non-Burmans might see insights from their own political and social
traditions valued as part of a broader national discourse.
6.
Inclusion matters
Although
Myanmar school textbooks portray Panglong as the moment when all of the
country's ethnic groups came together to declare their intentions to join
together in a union, the signatories to the agreement were only a few Burman,
Shan, Kachin, and Chin leaders. The British required General Aung San to get
agreement from the "Frontier Areas," the administrative region of the
country that comprised the border areas. While this area was occupied by more
than just the Shan, Kachin, and Chin, other groups were excluded for a number
of reasons, many of which have been explained by historians and analysts.
Beyond the groups that were specifically excluded, many marginalized
populations within the Burmans, Shan, Kachin, and Chin were not a part of the
discussions.
The
question of inclusion will be critical for future political discussions. Who
will be included? Who will have the authority to decide who is included?
Inter-personal rivalries have often inhibited pan-ethnic solidarity and they
have also had an influence on who has been included in recent peace talks and
political discussions. How can we determine if certain groups are representative
of the populations they claim to represent? Women's groups, for example, have
conducted important research and advocacy campaigns in conflict zones, in
addition to providing basic services for people in need. However, they have
more often than not been excluded from the current peace talks and from most
political negotiations between the Burman-led government and non-Burman groups;
exclusion like this is absolutely unacceptable given the critical and
constructive role of women in building peace in Myanmar and helping to create a
more just society.
The
initial Panglong Conference sought to bring together different ethnic groups
and the assumption is that a future political settlement would also be along
ethnic lines. This, however, will not be sufficient in dealing with the wide
range of identities and identity conflicts that exist in present day Myanmar.
Although it would certainly make the discussions more challenging and complex,
the conversation needs to include marginalized populations beyond ethnic
groups. These include religious minorities, sexual minorities, and
under-represented socio-economic interests, just to name a few.
Additionally,
are there Burman groups and perspectives that ought to be included beyond the
government, the military, and maybe a few of the prominent democratic
opposition groups? What about other identities that are not easily captured by
the "ethnic" framework, such as Sino-Myanmar, Burmese of Indian
descent, or the Rohingya? While some Burmese may find this suggestion
unreasonable, Myanmar's recent history of political exclusion has gone well
beyond ethnic identity and a national effort that will contribute to peace and
reconciliation must consider the dynamics of marginalization beyond ethnicity.
7.
Power dynamics matter
The
general political climate at the time of the Panglong Conference was one in
which it was clear that the British wished to negotiate a transition to
independence as quickly as possible while minimally honoring obligations to
their non-Burman allies. This meant that they were willing to work primarily
with General Aung San, which gave him a much stronger bargaining position at
the conference. Even on the non-Burman side, the negotiations at Panglong were
complicated by the prominent role played by hereditary leaders such as the Shan
saophas (sawbwas) and Kachin duwas, who enjoyed a high degree of traditional
legitimacy.
Those
concerned with the ways in which power dynamics can silence marginalized voices
ought to be asking a number of questions regarding the organization of future
political discussions. What will the structure of the meeting(s) be? Where will
they take place? What will be the methods of discussion? Will they privilege
men or older people, as is common in Myanmar society? Will they privilege those
with Western education, fluency in English, or law and politics degrees? In
essence, these questions boil down to one: who gets to assess what is and is
not a valuable contribution to the discussion process?
While
the discussion currently seems to revolve around degrees of political and
economic autonomy for non-Burman states, how will minority groups be treated
more generally? This refers not only to ethnic minorities in Burman divisions,
but also to non-Burman minorities in other states, such as the Shan population
living in Kachin State. Attention to power dynamics will also force
participants to contend with an uncomfortable question: How much bargaining
power do non-Burman groups really have in the current political situation?
While
there is undoubtedly pressure on the government and the military to address the
"ethnic" issue in Myanmar, international actors are putting equal, if
not greater, pressure on non-Burman groups to seize the current opportunity and
sign agreements, no matter how unsatisfactory they may be. Many non-Burman
leaders at the first Panglong Conference underestimated the degree to which the
British were eager to end their colonial involvement in Burma; current leaders
cannot make the same mistake and international actors ought to be encouraging a
process that pays attention to power inequalities and the demands of justice.
Power
dynamics also matter in assessing where real decision-making authority lies.
Can U Aung Min and his negotiating team make credible commitments on behalf of
the government and the Tatmadaw? Will the military agree to abide by the terms
of a ceasefire and what is its promise worth considering they have violated
agreements in the past? Persistent fears about the degree to which the military
is invested in the process of political negotiation also strengthen the hand of
the government side. Government negotiators can present themselves as the
"good guys," attempting to blunt potential roadblocks from the
military while also pressing non-Burman groups to give in and accept a
one-sided "compromise."
8.
Take your time
General
Aung San understood that the British wanted to wash their hands of the
situation in Burma after World War II and took advantage of that fact to push
for immediate independence. Not only did this put pressure on the non-Burman
groups to acquiesce quickly to an agreement, it also resulted in a rather
undemocratic process. For example, given the small window of opportunity to get
agreement from the Frontier Areas leaders to join the Union of Burma, Aung
San's political party, the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League), chose
to work primarily with the hereditary leaders who enjoyed greater standing in
the eyes of the British administration rather than more democratically-inclined
allies such as the Shan State People's Freedom League and the Kachin Youth
League.
The
current situation has many similar elements. While both the Myanmar government
and many of the non-Burman political and armed groups have become more
democratic over time, there are still many individuals and organizations within
these communities that have been pushing for more transparency, inclusiveness,
and democratic decision-making. However, with the pressure to get a "quick
win" before the 2015 elections, it is likely that a slower, more
consultative process will be passed over in favor of a settlement that wins the
approval of international observers, but doesn't effectively respond to the
concerns non-Burmans have expressed over the years.
Additionally,
the growing sentiment in the international community that there is a
fast-closing window of opportunity for political negotiation puts greater
pressure on non-Burman groups to come to the table, even when the offerings
from the government side are less than ideal. This discourse (which is also
reinforced by some members of non-Burman groups seeking to push for peace and a
quick settlement) paints reluctant groups and individuals as
"spoilers" who are inhibiting the chances for peace.
The
spoiler discourse is dangerous, especially since the concerns raised by some of
those who are now labeled as "spoilers" are the same concerns many
non-Burmans have expressed consistently over the past few decades. The risk is
that the pressure to come to an agreement in time for the electoral benefits to
pay off in 2015 will result in a flawed settlement that legitimizes a hastily
negotiated and non-representative agreement. Domestic and international groups
who claim to be supporting "democratic development" in Myanmar need
to recognize the potentially destructive effects of this pressure and to
support instead a more thoughtful, inclusive process.
9.
Acknowledge the difficult history
The
Panglong Conference took place only a few years after World War II had ended in
Burma. This was a war that initially saw mostly Burmans allied with the
Japanese fighting against mostly non-Burmans allied with the British. Near the
end of the war, the Burmans abruptly switched sides, joining with the
British-led Allies to drive the Japanese out of the country. The complexities
of this conflict and the lingering hostilities went almost completely
unexamined at Panglong.
No
one discussed, for example, the atrocities committed by Burman and Karen troops
against each other's civilian populations (probably because the Karen weren't a
part of the Panglong negotiations, but there were other examples). No one
raised the ways in which the pre-war nationalist movement was configured in
part against non-Burmans as allies of the oppressive colonial authority, the
flare-ups of violence directed at non-Burman and non-Buddhist populations in
the 1930s, or the ways in which the British had used non-Burman troops to quell
Burman rebellions. Panglong didn't address the underlying tensions between the
groups that were about to form an independent nation, and as a result there was
no basis for sticking together once those tensions and grievances resurfaced.
Political
discussions in the current period not only need to acknowledge the complex
pre-independence history of opposition and mistrust, they also have to honestly
engage with the subsequent decades of civil conflict and oppression experienced
by the vast majority of Myanmar's population. The trust-building that will be
necessary to facilitate stability and growth cannot occur without recognition
of this history. The most challenging element of this acknowledgement will be
on the side of the Tatmadaw. Present and past military leaders are justifiably
terrified of the possibility of one day being tried for war crimes or crimes
against humanity (and it's likely that some leaders of non-state armed groups
might fall into this category as well) and there is a range of opinions inside
and outside of Myanmar as to what justice might look like in this transitional
context (tribunals, truth commissions, public apologies, etc.).
The
frank truth of the matter is that the Tatmadaw holds most of the cards; the
military will likely resist any efforts at uncovering past or present abuses
and the international community has so far shown no inclination towards
concerted action that would bring this about. Perhaps the best place to begin
is through all sides honestly engaging with a harsh and brutal history of
exclusion and violence. Could the military be appealed to on the grounds of its
own supposed dedication to the nation?
Its
current leaders have been using language that suggests they view their present
incarnation as a different institution not to be judged by past actions, but
this would definitely not be a sufficient response in a reconciliation process.
Would more honest self-reflection on the part of the military (without the
threat of punishment) be enough to satisfy its tens of millions of victims?
There will likely be conflicting answers to these questions, but a crucial
lesson from Panglong is that unacknowledged grievances will not stay hidden
forever.
10.
Accept that there is no "Union Spirit" or "Panglong Spirit"
This
is perhaps the most controversial of the lessons that emerge from Panglong. An
examination of the accounts of the conference reveals that the Shan, Kachin,
and Chin joined the Union for primarily economic and instrumental reasons. Most
of these leaders remained skeptical of the degree to which they would actually
be incorporated into the Union as equals (indeed, some were unsure whether they
wanted this themselves).
It
is even difficult to attribute to the AFPFL leaders the type of "Union
Spirit" that is celebrated in Myanmar's textbooks since the British
required that they gain the agreement of the Frontier Areas in order to achieve
independence. All of this suggests that there was no "Union Spirit"
at the time of the Panglong Agreement, and that furthermore the waves of
ideological, religious, and ethnic rebellions that occurred in the years
following independence provide additional proof that Panglong did not succeed
in creating that spirit.
While
official versions of the history honor Panglong as an expression of "Union
Spirit", it must be acknowledged that the decades of civil conflict in
Myanmar that followed independence represent strong evidence of the lack of
this spirit in the country. Many groups never felt themselves to be a part of
the Burmese nation after independence and have pointed to formal policies of
discrimination as well as informal methods of exclusion from full membership in
the national community.
Proclamations
from the government and the military that insist not only on the foundational
presence of "Union Spirit" but also on the duty of every citizen to
cherish and safeguard it only further reinforce the view of many non-Burmans
that the government does not take their concerns seriously. One way to
recognize this fact would be for the government to acknowledge that "Union
Spirit" is something that needs to be actively constructed through
trust-building over a period of time. Without recognition of the present emptiness
of "Union Spirit", political settlements are unlikely to address the
deep divides that inhibit national reconciliation.
Beyond
Panglong
Soldiers
shouldn't lead political negotiations
There
are multiple modern examples (the Balkans Spring of 1941 comes to mind) of the
negative long term effects of war fighters serving as the sole voices in both
peace talks and subsequent political settlements. Their interests are primarily
in military matters and beyond that in maintaining economic and political power
and in some cases control over territory. Inclusive participatory negotiations
are generally not first in the minds of those who have been engaged in
prolonged armed conflict. This is not necessarily a criticism as much as an
observation of the dynamics of peace talks led by fighters.
In
Myanmar there is the further complication that virtually every armed group in
the country has been involved in various atrocities, committed against each
other in violation of laws of war, but more importantly against civilian populations.
This means that every one of the armed groups involved in the peace talks has
an incentive to avoid transparent and detailed engagement with questions
related to war crimes and abuses committed against civilians.
If
their voices are the only ones helping to create a peace settlement, they may
very well close off opportunities for addressing critical questions of justice
that would be a necessary component of reconciliation, both between and within
different ethnic groups. Not only do groups and individuals with grievances
against both the Tatmadaw and non-state armed groups need to be involved, these
dynamics also highlight the importance of participation by Tatmadaw officers
themselves as a way of acknowledging past wrongs and moving towards a common
understanding of both national and human security concerns.
"Equality"
won't correct years of institutionalized inequality
Decades
of centralized control supported by military might has meant that, despite
living in resource-rich areas of the country, most non-Burmans have not seen
the benefits of economic development. In places where the government or
military have not been able to monopolize resource extraction, other strongmen
have stepped in to reap the rewards. There may be a strand of logic in the
military argument that they have deployed their forces predominantly in
non-Burman border states because those have been the regions with active armed
rebellions, but whatever the motivation, the result has been persistent
militarization and poverty for the populations of those regions. These factors,
combined with a lack of educational or economic opportunities have made it more
likely that people will remain in a cycle of poverty and marginalization.
Political
settlements in these areas will have to acknowledge this fact and provide more
than just guarantees of "equality" for non-Burmans in the country.
While overt ethnic discrimination may be declining in Myanmar, notwithstanding
the recent violent persecution of the ethnic Rohingya, a lasting peace could
easily be hindered by an insufficient response to entrenched privilege and
institutionalized inequality. To put it simply, populations that have suffered
disproportionately over the past decades will need a more active,
interventionist state to help level the playing field.
If
Myanmar is to have a more inclusive state with something approaching equality
of opportunity, it will require policies of affirmative action that explicitly
give benefits to historically disadvantaged populations, including, but not
limited to, those based on ethnicity. These might include more spending on
education both in non-Burman languages and in non-Burman areas more generally,
reserved seats in universities and in the civil service, preferential hiring to
ensure that development projects actually improve the livelihoods of local
populations, or a national government body to assess and provide redress for
civil rights violations.
Of
course, these policies would also need to be adaptable, in order to respond to
changing dynamics of opportunity and inequality. Developing these policies will
primarily be the responsibility of the Myanmar government, but the
international community can play a role in being sensitive to these dynamics
both in the distribution of aid and, more importantly, in investment in the
country.
Conclusions
Myanmar's
leaders and citizens have many global models to draw on in facilitating
national reconciliation, post-conflict transformation, and a gradual move
towards federalism and increased regional autonomy. Yet an event like Panglong
still retains a pull on the national imagination, as much for what it could
represent as for what it actually was. Even though many groups have advocated
for a "Second Panglong" that would move toward a political settlement
of ethnic conflict, such a "conference" might still fall short of
being an effective vehicle for creating harmony and stability in the country,
even if it were more inclusive.
Instead
of considering a single Second Panglong Conference, Panglong Spirit could be
recognized as something that needs to be continually and actively constructed.
This would mean envisioning "Panglong" as more of an ongoing,
institutionalized process than an event. It could consist of meetings at
regular intervals and at various levels. Some of these meetings might be
"safe" spaces where groups could air their grievances freely and
others would simply be mutual teaching, where disparate groups learn about and
learn to respect each other's histories, customs, and aspirations. Some could
bring together different groups to identify common experiences and goals as
well as points of disagreement, while others would be designed to bring those
grievances and suggestions directly to policy makers and implementers. The
latter aspect is critical to ensuring that these conversations, while gradually
building trust and identifying common interests, were also regularly engaging
with government officials in a position to alter policy.
The
"agenda" for each meeting might vary based on local circumstances,
yet there might also be a national "coordinating" committee that
would ensure that different identity groups are sufficiently represented and
also that divergence of opinion within those groups is recognized and not
suppressed. The participants themselves - and the various communities and
identities that would be represented - would also change over time, as certain
grievances and inequalities are addressed and others emerge. The discussions
and conclusions of meetings could be disseminated in multiple languages,
fostering greater national understanding of the challenges facing different
communities, but also helping to hold the government accountable for actually
channeling grievances from the meetings into concrete policy changes.
A
model like this could only work with acknowledgement from the Myanmar
government that the "Panglong Spirit" is not something that ever
really existed among the population nor (and this part is very important)
something that will ever be fully realized. This is, in fact, the very reason
why a single event would never be sufficient for developing a more inclusive
political system. The nature of governments to view and categorize people in
convenient ways and the tendency to see national identity as something
primordial and given means that some individuals and groups will always find
themselves outside of the national community.
Justice
does not necessarily demand that every group be included, but it does demand
that every grievance be considered. In the case of Myanmar, the lens of justice
must be adaptable enough to look beyond ethnicity and to recognize the
repression of difference within and by groups that are themselves oppressed. By
seeing the creation of the Panglong Spirit as something aspirational and
continually in need of re-assessment, the people of Myanmar have a unique
opportunity to acknowledge the country's exclusionary past and to develop and
institutionalize a system that would accommodate the changing nature of
national identity, build trust between estranged groups, and create a more
inclusive and just union.
Matthew
J Walton is the Aung San Suu Kyi Senior Research Fellow in Modern Burmese
Studies at St Antony's College, University of Oxford. He is also a consultant
for The Elders on their engagement in Myanmar.
http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-02-070314.html
http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-02-070314.html
(Copyright
2014 Matthew J Walton) (7
March 2014)
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